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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS/PRIVACY—STAY  CALM, 
DON’T  GET  HYSTERICAL: A USER’S  GUIDE TO  ARGUING THE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANTI-VIBRATOR STATUTES 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 5, 2010 the Supreme Court of Alabama upheld an 
Alabama statute that prohibits the sale and distribution of sexual 
devices.1  The statute makes it illegal “to knowingly distribute, pos­
sess with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute . . . any 
obscene material or any device designed or marketed as useful pri­
marily for the stimulation of human genital organs for any thing of 
pecuniary value.”2  For reasons to be explained in this Note, the 
Alabama Supreme Court decided to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s 
reasoning in Williams v. Attorney General, a 2004 case that upheld 
the very same Alabama statute.3  In Williams, the Eleventh Circuit 
held that the statute was constitutional and refused to extend the 
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence v. Texas4 to 
the commercial activity involved with the sale and distribution of 
1. 1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover, 45 So. 3d 319, 341 (Ala. 
2010) (en banc).  A distributor of the devices, including vibrators and dildos, (in a 
counter-claim) argued that the statute violated the United States Constitution’s right to 
due process and that the Alabama Supreme Court should follow the reasoning in Relia­
ble Consultants, Inc. v. Earle.  Id. (citing Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 
738 (5th Cir. 2008)).  Dr. Marty Klein, author of America’s War on Sex: The Attack on 
Law, Lust & Liberty, stated: “‘The Supreme Court has declared our orgasms a battle­
field, and sex toys another casualty.’”  David Holthouse, Alabama v. Dildos, Attorney 
General Troy King Stands Hard Against Stimulators, DAME  MAG., http://www.dame 
magazine.com/features/f261/AlabamavsDildos.php?Page=2 (last visited Jan. 12, 2011). 
In response to the ruling, Representative John Rogers (D-Birmingham) sponsored a 
bill to remove the ban on the devices, stating: “‘A shower head can be a sex toy. . . .  It’s 
just a matter of bringing the state into the 21st Century.’” Id.  Attorney General Troy 
King of Alabama claims the statute’s goal is to prevent the “‘evil of commerce of sexual 
stimulation and auto-eroticism, for its own sake.’” Id.  Citizens of Alabama were called 
upon to send the Attorney General “‘the most humiliating sex toy they [could] find.’” 
Id. 
2. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005).  Section (a)(2) makes it 
unlawful for “a wholesaler, to knowingly distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or 
offer to agree to distribute, for the purpose of resale or commercial distribution at re­
tail” any sexual device. Id. § 13A-12-200.2(a)(2).  Section (a)(3) made it illegal to “pro­
duce” such devices. Id. § 13A-12-200.2(a)(3). 
3. Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004). 
4. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute 
prohibiting homosexual conduct was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment). 
211 
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the sexual devices.5  Additionally, the Supreme Court of Alabama 
recognized that a Fifth Circuit case, Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. 
Earle,6 extended the ruling in Lawrence to a Texas statute also 
prohibiting the sale of sexual devices.7  As the Supreme Court of 
Alabama stated, succinctly identifying the topic of this Note: “It is 
clear from the discussions in Williams VI [Williams v. Attorney 
General, 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004)] and Reliable Consul­
tants that the debate about the scope of Lawrence v. Texas remains 
open.”8 
The current split in the circuit courts, most recently recognized 
in 1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover centers on just 
how far Lawrence extends beyond the facts of that case, and 
whether Lawrence is applicable to activity outside the home.9  The 
Fifth Circuit stated that “[o]nce Lawrence is properly understood to 
explain the contours of the substantive due process right to sexual 
intimacy, the case plainly applies.”10  The question then becomes: 
does Lawrence really plainly apply?  While the Fifth Circuit seems 
to think the case applies to the sale and distribution of sexual de­
vices, the Eleventh Circuit clearly does not and has stated that it 
“[declines] to extrapolate from Lawrence and its dicta a right to 
sexual privacy triggering strict scrutiny.”11  Therefore, there is cur­
rently one circuit under the impression that Lawrence clearly ap­
plies to these statutes prohibiting the sale of sexual devices, and 
another circuit under the impression that they would have to “ex­
trapolate” from the language of Lawrence in order to rule these 
statutes unconstitutional. 
This Note explores the question of whether Lawrence extends 
to the commercial activity prohibited by statutes such as the one in 
Alabama.  This Note will argue that the analysis in both the Fifth 
and the Eleventh Circuits regarding the sale and distribution of sex­
ual devices are improper.  While this Note argues, in agreement 
with the Fifth Circuit, that selling and distributing sexual devices 
should be constitutionally protected across the board, this Note ar­
gues that Lawrence is not the applicable case in asserting that these 
5. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1238. 
6. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 744-45. 
7. 1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover, 45 So. 3d 319, 337-41 (Ala. 
2010). 
8. Id. at 340. 
9. Id. 
10. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 744. 
11. Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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statutes are unconstitutional. Lawrence has left the question of 
whether there is a new fundamental right to privacy unclear.12  The 
confusion over Lawrence is evidenced by the current circuit split. 
However, the proper analysis involves Carey v. Population Services 
International13 and the line of Supreme Court cases ruling on the 
sale and distribution of contraceptives since sexual devices are be­
ing used more frequently for health and birth control reasons. This 
Note will argue that because creating a new fundamental right is so 
difficult, the best way to ensure statutes, like the ones in Alabama 
and Texas, are deemed unconstitutional is to place the sale and dis­
tribution of sexual devices under the already-existing right pro­
tected in the Carey line of cases.  If the sale and distribution of 
sexual devices is successfully included within an established funda­
mental right, the statutes will move beyond a rational basis review 
and achieve a strict scrutiny review, which will allow courts the op­
portunity to deem the statutes as too burdensome. 
Part I of this Note chronicles the history of sexual devices in 
America. Part II provides some historical background on the case 
law and development of the idea of examining “sexual privacy” 
through the so-called “sexual freedom cases.”14  Part III gives a 
brief history of the state case law that has developed around stat­
utes that control the sale of these devices.  Part IV discusses the 
current circuit split among the Fifth and Eleventh circuits and the 
Lawrence v. Texas decision.  Part V argues that Lawrence is not the 
proper case for analyzing the constitutionality of sexual device stat­
utes, due to the commercial activity dealt with in this topic, but that 
the real support lies in Griswold and its progeny. 
I. THE HISTORY OF SEXUAL DEVICES IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Vibrator: Pre-1920 
The end of the nineteenth century brought the development of 
the first vibrator as an electromechanical medical instrument.15 
Prior to the development of the vibrator, physicians and midwives 
would manually massage their female patients to orgasm as a cure 
12. 1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 340. 
13. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
14. Angela Holt, Comment, From My Cold Dead Hands: Williams v. Pryor and 
the Constitutionality of Alabama’s Anti-Vibrator Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 927, 938 (2002). 
15. RACHEL P. MAINES, THE  TECHNOLOGY OF  ORGASM 3 (Merritt Roe Smith 
eds., 1999).  The author would like to note that there is very little written about the 
history and development of sexual devices in the United States. That is why the pre­
dominant source for this part of the background is Maine’s book. 
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for “hysteria.”16  The invention came as a relief to physicians, who 
were looking for a way to therapeutically cure these women, but in 
such a way “that neither fatigued the therapist nor demanded skills 
that were difficult and time-consuming to acquire.”17  The efficiency 
of the mechanical device facilitated a much more productive office, 
which was necessary owing to frequent repeated visits by hysterical 
patients.18  By 1900, there was an increasing variety of vibrators, 
ranging “from low[er] priced . . . models to the Cadillac of vibrators, 
the Chattanooga.”19 
Post-1900, there were numerous big incentives for people to 
purchase these vibrators for “self-treatment,” rather than continu­
ally having to go to a doctor’s office every time symptoms oc­
curred.20  It was much cheaper to purchase a home device than to 
go back for repeated doctor visits.21  Additionally, not only was it 
more cost efficient, but it allowed for use at home alone and as 
often as was needed or desired.22 
With the increasing popularity and availability of electricity in 
the home, women became heavy consumers of electrical devices.23 
The vibrator was the fifth home appliance manufactured to run 
from electricity, preceded only by the sewing machine, the fan, the 
teakettle, and the toaster.24 
16. Id.  “Massage to orgasm of female patients was a staple of medical practice 
among some (but certainly not all) Western physicians from the time of Hippocrates 
until the 1920s, and mechanizing this task significantly increased the number of patients 
a doctor could treat in a working day.” Id.  “Hysteria” was literally translated to 
“womb disease” and was considered to be extremely prevalent in women. Id. at 1-3. 
17. Id. at 11.  Maines points out that “[t]here is really no evidence that male phy­
sicians enjoyed providing pelvic massage treatments,” and that they would try to dele­
gate the duty to anyone, or anything, they could. Id. at 4. 
18. Id. at 11. 
19. Id. at 15.  The first electromechanical vibrator was designed by Joseph Morti­
mer Granville in the 1880s. Id. It was battery operated and similar to the modern 
version of the vibrator. Id.  “At the Paris Exposition in 1900, there were exhibited 
more than a dozen [v]ibrators.” SAMUEL MONELL, A SYSTEM OF INSTRUCTION IN X­
RAY METHODS AND MEDICAL USES OF LIGHT, HOT AIR, VIBRATION AND HIGH FRE­
QUENCY CURRENTS 595 (1902). 
20. MAINES, supra note 15, at 100. R 
21. Id.  The cost of purchasing an at-home vibrator did not cost more than four or 
five visits to the doctor. Id. 
22. Id.  There were also water-powered vibrators, but the battery powered de­
vices were more desirable as they could be used almost anywhere. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id.  It is interesting to note that the electrical vibrator actually came before 
“the electric vacuum cleaner by . . . nine years, the electric iron by ten, and the electric 
frying pan by more than a decade, possibly reflecting consumer priorities.” Id.; see also 
MALCOM  MACLAREN, THE  RISE OF THE  ELECTRICAL  INDUSTRY  DURING THE  NINE­
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Rachel Maines notes that the first advertising for a vibrator 
appeared in McClure’s Magazine in 1899 and was for the “Vibra­
tile.”25  There was a brief period in the first two decades of the 
twentieth century when water-powered vibrators were quite popu­
lar, including the “Hydro-Massage,” which was advertised in the 
December 1906 issue of Modern Women.26  However, the great ma­
jority of advertisements for vibrators in the first three decades of 
the twentieth century came in the form of those that are still pro­
duced today for “home massage.”27  Most often, when magazines 
would have advertisements for vibrators, they were hardly men­
tioned in any other way throughout the magazine.28  These devices 
were not just limited to smaller, no-name manufacturers; big names 
like General Electric took out full-page ads for “The Home Electri­
cal” between the years 1915 and 1917.29  Sears, Roebuck and Com­
pany advertised six models of vibrators in their Electrical Goods 
catalog in 1918.30  Between 1900 and 1920, most of the devices were 
available by mail order.31  Starting in the 1920s some brands, which 
TEENTH  CENTURY 91, 96 (1943); SIGVARD  STRANDH, A HISTORY OF THE  MACHINE 
225-26 (Turlough Johnston & Kerstin Stälbrand eds., Ann Henning trans., 1979). 
25. MAINES, supra note 15, at 100.  The advertisement claimed that the “Vibra- R 
tile” was a cure for “neuralgia,” “headache,” and “wrinkles.” Id. (quoting MCCLURE’S 
MAG., Mar. 1899, at 158).  Around this time, the sale of “massagers” had begun to 
increase immensely and the makers of these devices claimed they could cure any variety 
of diseases. Id.  It should be noted that none of these ads were explicitly sexual, but 
they all had an underlying tone of sexuality.  For example, one ad for a vibrator stated, 
“‘The most perfect woman is she whose blood pulses and oscillates in unison with the 
natural law of being.’” Id. at 101 (quoting To Women I Address My Message of Health 
and Beauty, NAT’L  HOME J., Apr. 1908, at 17 (advertisement from Bebout Vibrator 
Company)).  An ad in Woman’s Home Companion in 1906 used language that would 
lead a reader today to wonder: “The number and strength of the movements that can be 
applied by hand are extremely limited; the perfectly adjusted American Vibrator runs 
indefinitely and is susceptible of a variety and rapidity of movements utterly impossible 
of human attainment.”  MAINES, supra note 15, at 103 (emphasis omitted). R 
26. MAINES, supra note 15, at 101-02 (referring to an advertisement for the Wer- R 
ner Motor Company’s water-powered “Hydro-massage” appearing in MODERN  WO­
MEN, Dec. 1906, at 190). 
27. Id. at 102. 
28. Id. at 103.  There are apparently two exceptions to this rule: (1) in June 1908, 
a “Review of Reviews” cautioned readers against using the devices in excess, and (2) in 
1916, a “Good Housekeeping” review that stated the vibrators were “‘soothing to the 
skin.’” Id. 
29. Id. at 104; see also GENERAL  ELECTRIC  COMPANY, A GENERAL  ELECTRIC 
SCRAPBOOK HISTORY, WITH COMMENTARY 22 (n.d.) (scrapbook distributed by General 
Electric that includes advertisements of the “The Home Electrical”). 
30. MAINES, supra note 15, at 104 (emphasis omitted).  Along with the vibrators, R 
the catalog included advertisements for everyday appliances like “coffee urns, toasters, 
irons, heaters, [and] hair dryers.” Id. 
31. Id. 
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could be purchased at retail stores, were specifically advertised to 
men as great gift ideas for women.32  The most widely advertised of 
the brands were the White Cross Electric Vibrators.33  The ads for 
these vibrators appeared “in Needlecraft, Home Needlework Maga­
zine, American Magazine, Modern Priscilla, the National Home 
Journal, and Hearst’s.”34 
B. The Vibrator-Post 1920-Present 
After about 1928, advertisements for vibrators essentially dis­
appeared until the re-emergence of “the modern vibrator . . . in the 
1960s as a frankly sexual toy.”35  Historian Roger Blake has 
deemed the “vibrator[ ] the ‘oldest sex gadget of the twentieth cen­
tury.’”36  Blake adds to his observation by noting that there was a 
prominent display of a vibrator in a 1920s movie entitled “Widow’s 
Delight.”37  The movie showed a woman using a vibrator in an 
overtly sexual way, essentially making visible what many had cho­
sen to ignore with regards to vibrators, and removing the veil of the 
vibrator as simply a home or medical device.38  Maines postulates 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 104-05; see also DAVID J. PIVAR, PURITY CRUSADE: SEXUAL MORALITY 
AND SOCIAL CONTROL, 1868-1900 110-17 (1973).  “The brand, White Cross, was drawn 
from the name of an Episcopalian sexual purity organization that flourished in Britain 
in the late 1880s.” MAINES, supra note 15, at 107.  This particular “society was intro- R 
duced to America by . . . the Women’s Christian Temperance Union; its name on the . . . 
vibrator must have been intended to suggest virtue and chastity.” Id. 
34. MAINES, supra note 15, at 107.  The ads stated: R 
“You can relieve pain, stiffness and weakness, and you can make the body 
plump and build it up with thrilling, refreshing vibration and electricity. Just a 
few minutes’ use of the wonderful vibrator and the red blood tingles through 
your veins and arteries and you feel vigorous, strong and well. With our Elec­
tric Vibrator and special attachments you can convert any chair into a perfect 
vibrating chair without extra cost, getting the genuine Swedish Movement and 
wonderfully refreshing effects, the same treatment for which you would have 
to pay at least $2.00 each in a physician’s office.” 
Id. (quoting from a magazine advertisement appearing in: MODERN  PRISCILLA, Dec. 
1910, at 27).  A similar ad read: 
“Vibration is life.  It will chase away the years like magic.  Every nerve, every 
fibre of your whole body will tingle with force of your own awakened powers. 
All the keen relish, the pleasures of youth, will throb within you.  Rich, red 
blood will be sent coursing through your veins and you will realize thoroughly 
the joy of living.  Your self-respect, even, will be increased a hundredfold.” 
Id. at 108 (quoting from a magazine advertisement appearing in: AM. MAG., Jan. 1913). 
35. Id.  There were some ads in the 1950s for massagers, but not for the vibrator. 
Id. 
36. Id. (quoting ROGER BLAKE, SEX GADGETS 33-34, 46 (1968)). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE105.txt unknown Seq: 7 27-SEP-11 10:20 
2011] THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANTI-VIBRATOR STATUTES 217 
that this type of exposure might have contributed to the vibrator 
being far less accepted in the home market since it no longer had 
the “social camouflage” provided by respectable home and medical 
uses.39 
While vibrators were not as heavily advertised between 1930 
and 1970, it appears they were still available.40  Starting in the latter 
half of the twentieth century and continuing until today, “the vibra­
tor has become an overtly sexual device.”41  Additionally, therapists 
often use it for treating women that are having difficulty reaching 
orgasm through other sexual activity.42 
The use of vibrators for medical and health purposes is still 
fairly prevalent today.  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
has recognized the use of “‘powered vaginal muscle stimulators’ 
and ‘genital vibrators’ for the treatment of sexual dysfunction or as 
an adjunct to Kegel’s exercise (tightening of the muscles of the pel­
vic floor to increase muscle tone).”43  The FDA requires that a 
premarket approval application (PMA) be filed “for any powered 
vaginal muscle stimulator” that is in commercial distribution.44 
These types of regulations also demonstrate that the federal gov­
ernment recognizes, at least medically, the utility of such devices.45 
The FDA categorizes the powered-vaginal-muscle stimulator, as a 
Class III device.46 
The FDA describes devices in Class III as “those that support 
or sustain human life, are of substantial importance in preventing 
impairment of human health, or which present a potential, unrea­
sonable risk of illness or injury.”47  Section 884 of the federal regu­
lations classifies devices categorized as “obstetrical and 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 109. Maines draws this conclusion because several authors in that time 
referenced vibrators and massagers with little explanation, presumably meaning they 
were still around and that knowledge about them remained well known. Id. 
41. Id. at 121. 
42. Id. at 122. 
43. State v. Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64, 75 (La. 2000); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 884.5940­
.5960 (2010). 
44. § 884.5940; see also U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DEVICE CLASSIFICATION, 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/Classify 
YourDevice/default.htm (last updated Apr. 27, 2009). 
45. Brenan, 772 So. 2d at 75. 
46. § 884.5940. 
47. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., PREMARKET APPROVAL (PMA), http://www. 
fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/Pre 
marketSubmissions/PremarketApprovalPMA/ucm2007514.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 
2010).  “PMA is the most stringent type of device marketing application required by 
FDA.” Id. 
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gynecological,”48 some of which are included under the Class III 
egorization.  Other Class III devices include “contraceptive in­
trauterine device (IUD) and introducer” and “contraceptive tubal 
occlusion device (TOD) and introducer.”49 
Presently, the vibrator is experiencing a renaissance of sorts 
and “the days of trying to buy a vibrator at a XXX porn shop out by 
the airport are long gone.”50  Not only are those days gone, but the 
days of vibrators taking center stage are literally here.  Playwright 
Sarah Ruhl wrote a play that has done just this.51  The play, entitled 
“In the Next Room or the vibrator play,” is set in the 1880s and 
revolves around “a doctor in upstate New York who uses a vibrator 
to treat ‘hysteria’ in women, [and] explores the conflicted territory 
of sex and intimacy in the moral climate of the Victorian Age.”52 
The play is partially inspired by Rachel Maine’s The Technology of 
Orgasm: Hysteria, the Vibrator and Women’s Sexual Satisfaction.53 
This play, written with an eye toward Broadway, might appear to 
indicate a movement toward more openness about the subject of 
sexual devices.  There are several instances in the play where the 
audience sees “depictions of two women and a man using 
vibrators.”54  During one of the performances, a man in the audi­
ence left the theater and explained to his wife that this was a play 
for women.55  In another instance, a husband stood up during a vi­
brator scene and moved ten seats away from his wife.56  One person 
associated with the play, explained how he tends to downplay the 
word “vibrator,” because he finds the word effectively scares peo­
ple away before they even know what the play is really about.57 
The play, though considered by some as a play for women, 
reached a new level in the world of theater. The play was nomi­
48. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 884.1-.5970; see also U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DEVICE 
CLASSIFICATION  PANELS, http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationand 
Guidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/ucm051530.htm (last updated May 13, 2009). 
49. § 884.5360; see also § 884.5380. 
50. Neelanjana Banerjee, Plug it In: The Many Joys of Sex Toys Takes it to the 
Next Level, NAT’L  SEXUALITY  RESOURCE  CTR. (Jan. 10, 2004), http://nsrc.sfsu.edu/ 
article/plug_it_many_joys_sex_toys_takes_it_next_level. 
51. Ellen Gamerman, Blushes Over Broadway, WALL  ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704402404574529691155408608.html? 
mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsThird. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
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nated for several Tony Awards.58  “In the Next Room or the vibra­
tor play” was recognized in three categories: Best Play, Best 
Performance by a Featured Actress in a Play, and Best Costume 
Design of a Play.59  It appears as though America, however, was not 
ready for the play to win a 2010 Tony.60 
So, while the days of purchasing sexual devices by the airport 
might be gone, the word “vibrator” and the subject matter is still 
seen as somewhat taboo.  Even in a time when both men and wo­
men have starred in and purchased tickets to a play depicting the 
use of vibrators, it is still thought of as a subject affecting mostly 
women. 
II.	 THE DEVELOPMENT OF “SEXUAL PRIVACY” IN THE 
SUPREME COURT: THE “SEXUAL FREEDOM CASES” 
A. Griswold v. Connecticut 
The first case in the line of the so-called “sexual freedom 
cases” is Griswold v. Connecticut.61  The appellant, Griswold, was 
the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Con­
necticut.62  The League would often educate married couples about 
contraceptives, including “information, instruction, and medical ad­
vice.”63  Griswold and several colleagues “were found guilty as ac­
cessories” for violating two Connecticut statutes.64  The Supreme 
Court ruled that the appellants had standing to sue and raise the 
constitutional rights of the married people they worked with.65 
Furthermore, the Court explained that the laws directly affected 
“an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician’s role 
in one aspect of that relation.”66  By finding support in its First 
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court stated that the rights enu­
58. Who’s Nominated?, TONY  AWARDS (June 13, 2010), http://www.tonyawards. 
com/en_US/nominees/index.html. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
62. Id. at 480. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. The first statute stated, “‘Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article 
or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty 
dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined 
and imprisoned.’” Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (repealed 1969)). The sec­
ond statute read, “‘Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands 
another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the prin­
cipal offender.’” Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-196 (repealed 1969)). 
65. Id. at 481. 
66. Id. at 482. 
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merated “in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emana­
tions from those guarantees that help give them life and 
substance.”67  Accordingly, the Court concluded that there are vari­
ous “zones of privacy” that are found throughout the Bill of 
Rights.68  The Court held that the marital relationship is one that 
lies within this zone of privacy.69  In finding the Connecticut stat­
utes unconstitutional, the Court recognized that marital privacy was 
particularly rooted in the past, and therefore it would be particu­
larly problematic to intrude on such a relationship.70 
B. Eisenstadt v. Baird 
Seven years later, the Supreme Court once again addressed the 
constitutionality of a statute regulating the distribution of birth con­
trol, but this time the statute in question was aimed at single per­
sons.71  In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the plaintiff was convicted of 
violating a Massachusetts statute forbidding the distribution of con­
traceptives to a person who did not fall within the married person 
exception of the statute.72  The Court found the statute’s “goals of 
deterring premarital sex and regulating the distribution of poten­
tially harmful articles” not legitimate and “violate[d] the rights of 
single persons under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”73  Unlike the statutes at issue in Griswold, these stat­
utes prohibited the distribution, but not the use, of contraceptives 
67. Id. at 484. 
68. Id.  The Court pointed to the right to association in the First Amendment; the 
right to be free from soldiers invading the home when at peace and the right to be free 
from searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment; the right to not self-incriminate 
in the Fifth Amendment; and the Ninth Amendment’s guarantee that simply because 
there are rights listed, does not mean they are exhaustive, as showing that the Constitu­
tion itself protects these “zones of privacy.” Id. 
69. Id. at 485. 
70. See id. at 486. 
71. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440-42 (1972).  After a speech at Boston 
University, the defendant, who became the appellee, gave a woman Emko vaginal 
foam. Id. at 440. 
72. Id. at 440.  The relevant part of the statute reads, in relevant part, “‘whoever 
. . . gives away . . . any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever for the prevention 
of conception,’ except as authorized in s[ection] 21A.” Id. at 440-41 (first and second 
alterations in original) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 21A (1966)). The excep­
tion discussed in section 21A reads, in relevant part, “‘A registered physician may ad­
minister to or prescribe for any married person drugs or articles intended for the 
prevention of pregnancy or conception.  A registered pharmacist actually engaged in 
the business of pharmacy may furnish such drugs or articles to any married person 
presenting a prescription from a registered physician.’” Id. at 441 (quoting MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 272, § 21A). 
73. Id. at 443. 
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by single persons.74  The Court went on to say, “If the right of pri­
vacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether 
to bear or beget a child.”75 
C. Roe v. Wade 
The next year, the landmark case of Roe v. Wade was de­
cided.76  At issue were Texas statutes that criminalized abortion.77 
The statutes made it illegal to “‘procure an abortion,’” unless it was 
“‘procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of sav­
ing the life of the mother.’”78  After surveying the history of abor­
tion,79 the Court noted that though the Constitution does not 
specifically say anything about a right to privacy, there is much 
in the case law to support a right of personal privacy within 
“certain areas or zones of privacy.”80  This right to privacy, 
wherever it is derived from,81 is large enough to protect a wom­
an’s choice to end her pregnancy.82  This right, however, is not 
74. Id. at 446. 
75. Id. at 453 (emphasis omitted). 
76. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe v. Wade, the unmarried and preg­
nant plaintiff sought an abortion by a “licensed physician, under safe, clinical condi­
tions,” but was prohibited from doing so by the Texas statutes in question. Id. at 120 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
77. Id. at 116. 
78. Id. at 117-18.  An abortion was defined as “mean[ing] that the life of the fetus 
or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman’s womb or that a premature birth thereof 
be caused.” Id. at 117 n.1.  Further: 
“If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or know­
ingly procure to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or 
shall use towards her any violence or means whatever externally or internally 
applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he shall be confined in the peniten­
tiary not less than two nor more than five years.” 
Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1191). 
79. Id. at 129-52. 
80. Id. at 152. 
81. The Court did not purport to say precisely or definitively where this right of 
privacy came from, only that it exists “whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amend­
ment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, 
as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the 
people.” Id. at 153. 
82. Id.  The Court noted that “additional offspring” can have a great impact on 
the life of a woman, including the psychological, mental, and physical-health aspects of 
requiring a woman to carry a pregnancy to term. Id.  This is particularly true when that 
woman is not in a condition to care for the child. Id. 
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absolute.83  The right of personal privacy must be balanced with a 
state’s valid interests in regulating the sphere of abortion,84 but 
those state interests must be compelling and narrowly tailored to 
such an interest.85 
D. Carey v. Population Services International 
In 1977, the Supreme Court had the opportunity yet again to 
hear a case concerning the sale and distribution of contraceptives.86 
In Carey v. Population Services International, the appellee was a 
company that had its main office in North Carolina, but regularly 
sold and advertised contraceptives, by mail, to the residents of New 
York.87  The company filled contraceptive orders with no concern 
as to the recipient’s age.88  After receiving several letters from New 
York officials alleging they were in violation of New York law, the 
company brought suit challenging the statute.89  Again, the Court 
stated that there were “‘certain areas or zones of privacy’” that 
were protected from government interference.90  The Court ex­
plained, “the decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at 
the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected 
choices.”91  The Court believed that the decision to actually con­
ceive, or to prevent such from occurring, is one that is particularly 
personal.92  However, this right is not absolute, and there could in 
83. Id. at 154 (“[A] State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding 
health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life.”). 
84. Id.  In the end, the determined “compelling point” was at the end of the wo­
men’s first trimester, and prior to that, it should be left up to the woman and her doctor 
to decide, without state interference, whether or not to terminate a pregnancy. Id. at 
163.  Prior to determining this compelling point, the Court went into significant detail 
and discussion about when life actually begins, and whether the Fourteenth Amend­
ment included an unborn fetus in the definition of a “person.” Id. at 159-63. 
85. Id. at 155. 
86. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
87. Id. at 682. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 682-84.  The New York statute reviewed by the court stated, in relevant 
part, that it was a crime “(1) for any person to sell or distribute any contraceptive of any 
kind to a minor under the age of 16 years; (2) for anyone other than a licensed pharma­
cist, to distribute contraceptives to persons 16 or over; and (3) for anyone, including 
licensed pharmacists, to advertise or display contraceptives.” Id. at 681. 
90. Id. at 684 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 152).  While the Court noted “that the 
outer limits of” a person being able to make certain decisions had not been decided, 
there were certain inclusions of personal decisions that already existed “‘relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and educa­
tion.’” Id. at 684-85 (citations omitted) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53). 
91. Id. at 685. 
92. Id. 
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theory be constitutionally permitted regulation of the production 
and sale of contraceptives.93 
New York attempted to argue that previous case law regarding 
the use of contraceptives should not apply because the statutes at 
issue in this case regulated the sale and distribution of contracep­
tives; the other cases should not affect the State’s power to limit 
such sales.94  “The fatal fallacy” with this defense was that it did not 
grasp “the underlying premise of” the previous decisions.95  That 
underlying premise was that the Constitution protects an individ­
ual’s right to decide whether to conceive or not to conceive.96  The 
Court recognized that there was no “independent fundamental 
‘right of access to contraceptives,’ but” that this access was inextri­
cably intertwined with the right to decide whether or not to bear or 
beget a child, which is where the fundamental right lies.97  The re­
striction on the attainment of contraceptives too severely burdened 
this right.98  This was the true reasoning behind the three previous 
cases decided by the Court.99  The limitation that the New York 
statute placed on contraceptives was a heavy burden on those who 
wanted to use them.100  The narrow provision allowing physicians to 
93. Id. at 685-86.  The Court noted that “even a burdensome regulation may be 
validated by a sufficiently compelling state interest . . .  [and as in abortion,] the right is 
not absolute, and . . . certain state interests” might be compelling enough to govern the 
abortion decision. Id. at 686. 
94. Id. at 686-87. 
95. Id. at 687. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 688. 
98. Id. at 687. 
99. Id. at 689. 
100. Id.  The Court noted that the burden in this case was not as great as if there 
had been a complete ban of distribution, but that reducing the number of “retail outlets 
renders contraceptive devices considerably less accessible to the public, reduces the op­
portunity for privacy of selection and purchase, and lessens the possibility of price com­
petition.” Id. (citations omitted).  Additionally, the Court believed that Doe v. Bolton 
was particularly relevant in this discussion, as the Court there ruled unconstitutional “a 
statute requiring that abortions be performed only in accredited hospitals.” Id. (citing 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 193-95 (1973)). 
In defense of the provision that prohibited the sale of contraceptives to those 
under sixteen years old, the appellants argued that it was an attempt to further the 
State’s policy of preventing “promiscuous sexual intercourse among the young.” Id. at 
692.  The Court initially struggled with this provision, as they were somewhat bothered 
by the fact that this particular conduct, when done by adults, was constitutionally pro­
tected and previous cases had noted that “‘[m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by 
the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.’” Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood 
of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)). The Court found unpersuasive the 
appellants’ argument that providing unlimited access to contraceptives to minors would 
increase their sexual activity. Id. at 694-95.  There was reason to question whether not 
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prescribe contraceptives to minors did not make the statute consti­
tutional.101  Finally, the provision prohibiting advertising contracep­
tives was also deemed unconstitutional.102  The Court noted that, in 
general, a burden placed on a fundamental right, such as to bear or 
beget a child, could only be supported by “compelling state inter­
ests” at are “narrowly drawn to express only those interests.”103 
Some believe that the above decisions show an underlying 
“right to engage in sexual activities for purposes other than repro­
duction,” or the “right to sex” view.104  Proponents of this view ar­
gue that these cases create a right to sexual autonomy.105 
III.	 DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW IN THE STATE COURTS 
PRE-LAWRENCE: STATE STATUTES 
There are currently three states that have statutes prohibiting 
the sale and distribution of sexual devices.106  These three states are 
allowing unlimited access would actually encourage minors to be less sexually active. 
Id. at 695.  While the Court claimed that any studies showing the high rate of sexual 
activity and the consequences of such activity among minors did not play any part in 
their decision, one has to wonder how true that actually was. Id. at 696. 
101. Id. at 697. 
102. Id. at 701-02.  Appellants claimed that the advertising of contraceptives 
“would be offensive and embarrassing to those exposed to them, and that permitting 
them would legitimize sexual activity of young people.” Id. at 701.  The Court rejected 
this argument and found none of the advertisements encouraged the young people to 
partake in sexual activities. Id. 
103. Id. at 686. 
104. David B. Cruz, “The Sexual Freedom Cases”? Contraception, Abortion, Ab­
stinence, and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 315 (2000); see also Val 
D. Ricks, Marriage and the Constitutional Right to Free Sex: The State Marriage Amend­
ments as Response, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 271, 271 (2005) (“A few judges in the 
United States have established in their thinking—and in some cases in their jurisdic­
tions—a constitutional right to ‘free sex.’”). But see Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. 
Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 50 EMORY L.J. 809, 819 (2010) (stating that the 
right to sex view is “overly optimistic about the Supreme Court’s view of these ‘sex 
cases’”). 
105. Cruz, supra note 104, at 317-18.	 R 
106. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 741 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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Mississippi,107 Alabama,108 and Virginia,109 as the Fifth Circuit 
noted in Reliable Consultants, Inc.110  The Supreme Court of Ala­
bama recently upheld the Alabama statute in March 2010.111  The 
Supreme Courts of Kansas,112 Louisiana,113 and Colorado114 have 
all ruled their respective state statutes banning the sale of sex toys 
107. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-105 (1999) states, in relevant part, that 
[a] person commits the offense of distributing unlawful sexual devices 
when he knowingly sells, advertises, publishes or exhibits to any person any 
three-dimensional device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the 
stimulation of human genital organs, or offers to do so, or possesses such de­
vices with the intent to do so.  A person commits the offense of wholesale 
distributing unlawful sexual devices when he distributes for the purpose of 
resale any three dimensional device designed or marketed as useful primarily 
for the stimulation of human genital organs, or offers to do so, or possesses 
such devices with the intent to do so. 
108.	 ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (LexisNexis 2005) states in relevant part: 
(a)(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly distribute, possess 
with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute any obscene material or 
any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of 
human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value. . . . 
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person, being a wholesaler, to knowingly 
distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute, for 
the purpose of resale or commercial distribution at retail, any obscene mate­
rial or any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation 
of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value. . . . 
(3) It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce, or offer or 
agree to produce, any obscene material or any device designed or marketed as 
useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs for any thing of 
pecuniary value. 
109. VA. CODE  ANN. § 18.2-374 (2009).  The statute makes it unlawful to 
knowingly 
(1) Prepare any obscene item for the purposes of sale or distribution; or 
(2) Print, copy, manufacture, produce, or reproduce any obscene item for 
purposes of sale or distribution; or 
(3) Publish, sell, rent, lend, transport in intrastate commerce, or dis­
tribute or exhibit any obscene item, or offer to do any of these things; or 
(4) Have in his possession with intent to sell, rent, lend, transport, or dis­
tribute any obscene item. Possession in public or in a public place of any ob­
scene item as defined in this article shall be deemed prima facie evidence of a 
violation of this section. 
Id.  “Obscene” items in the statute include: “Any obscene figure, object, article, instru­
ment, novelty device, or recording or transcription used or intended to be used in dis­
seminating any obscene song, ballad, words or sounds . . . .” Id. § 18.2-373. 
110. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 741. 
111. 1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover, 45 So. 3d 319, 346 (Ala. 
2010). 
112. State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023, 1032 (Kan. 1990). 
113. State v. Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64, 76 (La. 2000). 
114. People v. Seven Thirty-Five E. Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348, 372-73 (Colo. 1985) 
(en banc). 
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unconstitutional.  All these rulings took place before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lawrence. 
The Colorado Supreme Court found the Colorado anti-vibra­
tor statute unconstitutional, reasoning that it “impermissibly bur­
dens the right of privacy of those seeking to make legitimate 
medical or therapeutic use of such devices. The effect of the statute 
as now written is to equate sex with obscenity.”115  Furthermore, 
the state had offered no legitimate interest in prohibiting the use of 
the devices in these ways, and therefore the statute was deemed 
unconstitutional.116 
The Kansas Supreme Court struck down Kansas’s statute due 
to its overbroad reach, finding that it “impermissibly infringe[d] on 
the constitutional right to privacy in one’s home and in one’s doc­
tor’s or therapist’s office.”117  The Kansas Supreme Court focused 
on the medical uses of the devices.118  It additionally noted that an­
other court held that “the consumers’ privacy right in the use of the 
devices was inextricably bound with the vendors’ supply of the de­
vices,”119 meaning that preventing vendors from selling certain 
items affects consumers’ rights.120  The court additionally went on 
to state that “[a] therapist or a third person purchasing such a de­
vice for a woman at her request would nevertheless be subject to 
criminal prosecution.”121  Dr. Mould, one of the doctors who testi­
fied at the trial, stated that “he often direct[ed] his patients to adult 
bookstores to find dildo vibrators suitable for their therapy treat­
ment and that he” was of the “opinion that if [these devices] were 
to become not readily available to the general public, anorgasmic 
women would be ‘substantially impacted.’”122 
In State v. Brenan, Louisiana’s highest court struck down Loui­
siana’s obscenity statute because the statute lacked a rational con­
nection to the legislature’s intent.123  The legislation stated that the 
115. Id. at 370 (citation omitted). 
116. Id. 
117. Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1032. 
118. Id. at 1025-26. 
119. Id. at 1029.  When discussing the standing of the vendors to sue on behalf of 
individual users, the Kansas Supreme Court noted that “where personal privacy is in­
volved, potential purchasers may hesitate to assert their own rights because of a desire 
to protect that privacy from the publicity caused by a legal action.” Id. 
120. Id. at 1029-30. 
121. Id. at 1031. 
122. Id. at 1025.  Dr. Mould noted that the public absence of the sexual devices 
would seriously impact the treatment of these women. Id. 
123. State v. Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64, 75-76 (La. 2000). The Louisiana statute had 
banned “the promotion or wholesale promotion of obscene devices.” Id. at 67. The 
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ban on the sale and distribution of the sexual devices was for “the 
protection of minors and unconsenting adults.”124  The Louisiana 
court believed the real motive of the legislation was to wage war on 
obscenity rather than protect minors.125  However, Louisiana re­
fused to extend a new fundamental right to the use of sexual de­
vices, narrowly reading the substantive due process cases that had 
been decided by the United States Supreme Court.126  The court 
was aware that if they “extend[ed] constitutional protection to an 
asserted right or liberty interest, the courts have, to a great extent, 
placed the ‘right’ outside the arena of public debate.”127  This was 
something that the Louisiana court was not willing to do, and in­
stead it applied rational basis review to overturn the statute.128  The 
court additionally recognized the history of the devices and men­
tioned the Rachel Maines book.129 
IV. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. Lawrence v. Texas 
Though Texas, like Colorado, Kansas, and Louisiana, also had 
a statute banning the sale and distribution of sexual devices,130 it 
was their statute that banned actual sexual activity that made its 
way to the Supreme Court.  On June 26, 2003 the United States 
Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas,131 a principle decision 
statute defined “obscene devices” as “‘device[s], including an artificial penis or artificial 
vagina, which [are] designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of 
human genital organs.’” Id. (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106.1 (2010), invali­
dated by Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64).  It is important to note that though invalidated by the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, the invalidated section has still not been removed from the 
statute. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106.1.  In 2006, a couple was arrested and charged 
under this invalidated portion of the obscenity statute. Ruling Could Negate Sex Shop 
Busts, THE  OUACHITA  CITIZEN, Sept. 8, 2006, available at http://www.ouachitacitizen. 
com/print.php?story=354.  Later, the district attorney dropped the charges under sec­
tion 14:106.1, due to the fact the Louisiana Supreme Court had invalidated that portion 
of the statute. Attorney: Sex Shop Material Not Obscene, THE  OUACHITA  CITIZEN, 
Sept. 21, 2006, available at http://www.ouachitacitizen.com/news.php?id=377. The 
couple was, however, charged under section 14:106 of the statute for selling obscene 
videos. Id. 
124. Brenan, 772 So. 2d at 68. 
125. Id. at 72-73. 
126. Id. at 73. 
127. Id. at 71. 
128. Id. at 70-71, 76. 
129. Id. at 76. 
130. TEX. PENAL  CODE  ANN. §§ 43.21-23 (West 2003), invalidated by Reliable 
Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008). 
131. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-79 (2003). 
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in favor of the gay rights movement. The Court decided whether 
Texas could continue to prohibit persons of the same sex from en­
gaging in certain sexual conduct.132  The Texas statute made it a 
crime to partake in any “deviate sexual intercourse.”133  Texas po­
lice officers arrived at the residence of John Geddes Lawrence and 
found him engaged in sexual activity with Tyron Garner, activity 
that was prohibited by the Texas statute.134  The two men were ar­
rested, charged, and convicted of violating the statute.135  They 
“challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and of a like provision of the 
Texas Constitution.”136  This challenge was rejected both at the 
County Criminal Court and the Court of Appeals for the Texas 
Fourteenth District.137  The Court of Appeals followed the United 
States Supreme Court’s ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick.138  Certiorari 
was granted by the Supreme Court to determine whether the con­
victions violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal 
protection and due process—in other words, whether to overturn 
Bowers.139 
“ ‘History and tradition are the starting point but not in all 
cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.’”140 
Therefore, the Court proceeded to examine any historical attempts 
to regulate homosexual conduct to determine if the Bowers case 
was incorrect in determining that there was a long history of 
prohibiting homosexual conduct.141  The Court concluded “that 
there is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at 
132. Id. at 562. 
133. Id. at 563. The Texas statute provided: “‘A person commits an offense if he 
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.’” Id. 
(quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2003), invalidated by Lawrence, 539 
U.S. 558.  “Deviate sexual intercourse” was defined as: “(A) any contact between any 
part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the 
penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.” Id. (quoting 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01(1) (West 2003)). 
134. Id. at 562-63. 
135. Id. at 563. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id.; see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-96 (1986) (holding that there 
was no Constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy, thereby upholding a 
Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
139. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. 
140. Id. at 572 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
141. Id. at 567-68. 
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homosexual conduct as a distinct matter.”142  Furthermore, prose­
cutions of sodomy in the nineteenth century generally did not target 
“consenting adults in private,” but rather other non-consensual re­
lationships.”143  The Court concluded that the “laws and traditions 
in the past half century are of most relevance here.”144 
The Court refused to strike down the Texas statute on Equal 
Protection grounds, because it anticipated Texas would simply 
amend the statute to apply to both homosexual and heterosexual 
acts, thereby curing the equal protection problem.145  Instead, the 
Court decided it was best to overrule Bowers.146 Lawrence did 
“not involve minors,” or others that could be easily taken advan­
tage of.147  Instead, Lawrence involved consenting adults who “are 
entitled to respect for their private lives.”148  The Court recognized 
that the right to this consensual relationship is derived from the 
Due Process Clause and, as the Court noted, there was “no legiti­
mate state interest which can justify [the] intrusion into the per­
sonal and private life of the individual.”149  Additionally, the simple 
act of criminalizing homosexual conduct under state law invites dis­
crimination against the gay population.150  Over half of the Law­
rence opinion was devoted to an explanation of why it was 
necessary to overturn Bowers.151  Rightfully so, as stare decisis is an 
important jurisprudential doctrine.152 
142. Id. at 568.  The Court stated, “The absence of legal prohibitions focusing on 
homosexual conduct may be explained in part by noting that according to some scholars 
the concept of the homosexual as a distinct category of person did not emerge until the 
late 19th century.” Id. 
143. Id. at 569.  The Court further noted that “laws targeting same-sex couples 
did not develop until the last third of the 20th century” and that “[i]t was not until the 
1970’s that any State singled out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution.” Id. at 
570. 
144. Id. at 571-72.  This decision is significant to the gay rights and sexual privacy 
movements in general, as there has been an increasing acceptance of both in the past 
fifty years. Id. at 571-73.  Likewise, Lawrence would be highly pertinent in any attempt 
to establish a new fundamental right, as it guides attorneys to focus on the past fifty 
years. 
145. Id. at 575. 
146. Id. at 575-78. 
147. Id. at 578. 
148. Id. 
149. Id.  The Court also stated that this statute essentially demeaned the exis­
tence of homosexuals and “control[led] their destiny by making their private sexual 
conduct a crime.” Id. 
150. Id. at 575. 
151. Id. at 563-78. 
152. Id. at 577. 
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B. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Split 
In Williams v. Attorney General the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) brought suit on behalf of both sellers and users of 
sexual devices in Alabama.153  As stated above,154 the statute did 
not prohibit the use or possession of sexual devices, and it also did 
not prohibit the sale of “other sexual products such as ribbed con­
doms or virility drugs.”155  Rather, the question presented to the 
Eleventh Circuit was whether the Alabama statute restricted a fun­
damental right.156  The court inquired whether the use of these sex­
ual devices fell under an already protected fundamental right or 
whether it was necessary to create a new fundamental right that 
would cover the issue presented.157  The ACLU, representing the 
plaintiffs, argued that the use of sexual devices fell under the al­
ready protected realm of substantive due process.158  The ACLU 
claimed that through the Alabama statute, the State had “intruded 
into the most intimate of places—the bedrooms of its citizens—and 
the lawful sexual conduct that occurs therein.”159  Further, they 
claimed that though the statute did not prohibit the actual use of 
the devices, it placed a “substantial and undue burden on the ability 
of the plaintiffs to obtain devices regulated by the statute.”160  The 
ACLU thus argued that Alabama violated “the fundamental rights 
of privacy and personal autonomy that protect an individual’s law­
ful sexual practices guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.”161 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the ACLU’s argument, stating 
that “[t]he ACLU invokes ‘privacy’ and ‘personal autonomy’ as if 
such phrases were constitutional talismans.  In the abstract, how­
ever, there is no fundamental right to either.”162  The Eleventh Cir­
cuit noted that simply because a decision is “personal” or 
153. Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004). 
154. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. R 
155. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1233. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 1234. 
158. Id.  Substantive due process has been “long recognized as providing ‘height­
ened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and 
liberty interests.’” Id. at 1235 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000), 
rev’d, 378 F.3d 1232). 
159. Id. at 1235 (quoting Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d  1257, 1261 (N.D. Ala. 
2002). 
160. Id. (quoting Williams, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1261). 
161. Id. (quoting Williams, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1261). 
162. Id. 
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“intimate” does not mean that decision is instinctively or automati­
cally protected.163  According to the Williams court, a fundamental 
right is one that is “deeply rooted” in the history of the United 
States.164 
The Eleventh Circuit found nothing in the history of the sub­
stantive due process cases decided by the Supreme Court to support 
a “right to sexual privacy.”165  Most recently, the circuit noted, the 
Supreme Court had the opportunity in Lawrence v. Texas to assert 
a broad right to sexual privacy, and the Eleventh Circuit concluded 
that Lawrence provided no such ruling.166  What Lawrence did es­
tablish, the Eleventh Circuit ruled, was “the unconstitutionality of 
criminal prohibitions on consensual adult sodomy.”167  Because the 
Supreme Court did not go through the Washington v. Glucksberg 
analysis,168 the Eleventh Circuit refused to concede that Lawrence 
created any fundamental right, never mind one specifically regard­
ing “sexual privacy.”169  The Eleventh Circuit, therefore, went into 
its own Glucksberg analysis of the use of sexual devices and ulti­
mately found there to be no fundamental right.170 
Four years later, the Fifth Circuit decided Reliable Consultants, 
Inc. v. Earle, addressing a Texas statute that, like the Alabama stat­
163. Id. 
164. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)). Gluck­
sberg specifically stated that a fundamental right was “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 
(citation omitted). 
165. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1235.  The Eleventh Circuit found that after several 
opportunities to do so, the Supreme Court refused to recognize such a right and re­
iterated that the Supreme Court “has never indicated that the mere fact that an activity 
is sexual and private entitles it to protection as a fundamental right.” Id. at 1235-36. 
166. Id. at 1236. 
167. Id. 
168. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702. The Court in Glucksberg sought to determine 
whether a Washington statute’s “prohibition against ‘caus[ing]’ or ‘aid[ing]’ a suicide 
offends the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Id. at 705-06 
(alterations in original).  In determining a fundamental right, the analysis has two parts. 
Id. at 720.  First, the right at issue must be deeply rooted in the nation’s history. Id. at 
720-21.  Second, the Supreme Court also looks at the description of the asserted right. 
Id. at 721. 
169. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1236.  Specifically, the court stated that it was “not 
prepared to infer a new fundamental right from an opinion that never employed the 
usual Glucksberg analysis for identifying such rights.” Id. at 1237. 
170. Id. at 1239-44.  In the careful description part of the Glucksberg analysis, the 
court decided that the real right at stake in this case was the ability to “sell and 
purchase sexual devices,” rather than a broad right to sexual privacy. Id. at 1241-42. 
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ute, prohibited the sale and distribution of sexual devices.171  The 
plaintiffs ran a business that sold “sexual devices by internet and 
mail, and . . . distribute[d] sexual devices ordered in Texas by mail 
and common carrier.”172  They brought a lawsuit challenging the 
constitutionality of the Texas statute.173  The Fifth Circuit agreed 
with the plaintiffs and rejected Texas’s attempt to frame the right at 
issue so narrowly as simply a right to stimulate genital organs.174 
While the Eleventh Circuit refused to extend Lawrence v. Texas to 
commercial activity, the Fifth Circuit held that Lawrence recog­
nized not just “a right to engage in the sexual act itself, but instead 
a right to be free from governmental intrusion regarding ‘the most 
private human contact, sexual behavior.’”175  The Fifth Circuit 
found that Lawrence required it to decide “whether the Texas stat­
ute impermissibly burden[ed] the individual’s substantive due pro­
cess right to engage in private intimate conduct of his or her 
choosing.”176  The court found that because individuals could not 
purchase sexual devices in the state of Texas, the statute “heavily 
burden[ed]” the right at issue.177  This was consistent with the rea­
soning in Carey v. Population Services International178 and Gris­
wold v. Connecticut,179 “where the [Supreme] Court held that 
171. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 740-41 (5th Cir. 2008); see 
also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.21-.23, invalidated by Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 
F.3d 738.  Section 43.21(a)(7) defined “obscene device” as “a device including a dildo or 
artificial vagina, designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human 
genital organs.” Id. § 43.21(a)(7).  Section 43.23 made it a crime if a person “knowing 
its content and character, he wholesale promotes or possesses with intent to wholesale 
promote any obscene material or obscene device.” Id. § 43.23(a). 
172. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 742.  The plaintiffs did not own any 
businesses in the state of Texas, but wished to increase their presence in the state and 
were attempting to challenge the statute in an effort to preempt any prosecution for 
that increased presence. Id. 
173. Id. at 742-43.  Texas tried to argue that the plaintiffs did not have standing to 
bring the lawsuit on behalf of individual users. Id. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argu­
ment. Id. at 743.  It noted the line of Supreme Court cases holding that suits claiming 
that bans on certain commercial activities burden an individual’s due process rights can 
be brought by those who sell the products. Id. 
174. Id. at 743-44.  The plaintiffs framed “the right at stake [as] the individual’s 
substantive due process right to engage in private intimate conduct free from govern­
ment intrusion.” Id. at 743. 
175. Id. at 744. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-90 (1977); see supra 
notes 86-103 and accompanying text. R 
179. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); see supra notes 61­ R 
70 and accompanying text. R 
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restricting commercial transactions unconstitutionally burdened the 
exercise of individual rights.”180 
V.	 THE PRE-LAWRENCE CASES SHOULD SERVE AS THE GUIDE 
TO OVERTURNING ANTI-VIBRATOR STATUTES 
Creating a new fundamental right is an incredibly difficult en­
deavor, and courts do not take such a creation lightly. Therefore, 
rather than attempting to create a fundamental right for the use of 
sexual devices, this Note argues it is more practical to place the 
issue within a pre-existing fundamental right.  Due to the fact that 
sexual devices and contraceptives are similar in their history of reg­
ulation, this Note will further contend that the utilization of sexual 
devices can be analogized to the purposes of contraceptives, the use 
of which has been ruled to be fundamentally protected.  By apply­
ing the Supreme Court case law prior to Lawrence, this Note finds a 
protected right for the usage of sexual devices. Finally, this Note 
will explain the difference in review of a statute affecting a funda­
mental right and the importance of that review. 
A. A Constitutional Right to Sex? 
The so-called “sexual freedom” cases, which include Griswold, 
Eisenstadt, and Carey, have led some scholars to contemplate 
whether there is a “right to sex” embodied in these cases,181 which 
is based on the idea that there is “a right to engage in sexual activi­
ties for purposes other than reproduction.”182  In Carey, the Su­
preme Court stated that “[t]he decision whether or not to beget or 
bear a child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally 
protected choices,”183 which include such things as “‘procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and educa­
tion.’”184  There is a clear trend in the courts towards recognizing 
that intimate relationships are no longer, if they ever were, for 
purely procreative purposes.  Scholars have argued that if there was 
no constitutional right to non-procreative sex, then the Court would 
not have struck down the anti-contraceptive laws, because these 
“laws do not really deprive people of procreative control,” as indi­
180. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 744. 
181. See Holt, supra note 14, at 939 (citing Cruz, supra note 104, at 316). R 
182. Id. 
183. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685. 
184. Id. at 684-85 (citations omitted) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 
(1973)). 
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viduals could just remain abstinent.185  The Court reaffirmed this 
trend in the Lawrence decision, where it struck down the Texas 
anti-sodomy law as being unconstitutional.186 
When creating a new fundamental right in the field of constitu­
tional law and privacy, the Supreme Court has stated that they must 
“‘exercise the utmost care whenever [it is] asked to break new 
ground in this field.’”187  Creating a fundamental right can be in­
credibly difficult; a party must properly frame the right and then 
demonstrate that it is deeply rooted in the nation’s history.  Accord­
ingly, it is perhaps best for those challenging anti-vibrator statutes, 
like those in Alabama and Texas, to include the sale and purchase 
of sexual devices in an already existing right. 
B.	 Why the Regulation of the Sale and Distribution of Vibrators 
is Like the Regulation of the Sale and Distribution of 
Contraceptives 
What do sexual devices, birth control pills, and condoms have 
in common?  For one, they all have been, or currently are, regu­
lated by state statutes.188  Additionally, the statutes that prohibited 
the sale of contraceptives were very similar to the current statutes 
that prohibit the sale and distribution of sexual devices. For in­
stance, in the Eisenstadt case, the Court evaluated a Massachusetts 
statute189 that prohibited the distribution of “any drug, medicine, 
instrument or article whatever for the prevention of conception.”190 
The statute included an exemption whereby a registered physician 
was able to prescribe contraceptives to married persons and a phar­
macist was allowed to furnish these items with the prescription of a 
physician.191 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court read the exemption 
provisions to mean that anyone who was not either a registered 
physician or a pharmacist would be charged with a felony if they 
185.	 See, e.g., Holt, supra note 14, at 940. R 
186.	 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-79 (2003). 
187. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (quoting Collins v. 
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). 
188. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (reviewing 
statutes that regulated the use of birth control in the state of Connecticut); Williams v. 
Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004) (addressing the regulated sale, and in 
turn, the use of sexual devices in the state of Alabama). 
189. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972) (discussing MASS. GEN.  LAWS 
ch. 272, § 21). 
190.	 Id. at 440-41 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 21). 
191.	 Id. at 441-42. 
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distributed any article to be used in the prevention of conception.192 
The statute essentially allowed doctors to prescribe contraceptives 
to married couples to prevent pregnancy, but not to single individu­
als.193  The Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional on 
the basis of the Equal Protection clause.194 
The current Alabama statute prohibits any person or business 
from distributing any device marketed mainly “for the stimulation 
of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value.”195  A 
person who violates the statute is guilty of a misdemeanor and, if 
convicted, could be fined up to $10,000.196 Notably, however, the 
current Alabama statute also has an exemption provision, as did the 
statute at issue in Eisenstadt.  The Alabama statute’s exemption 
provides that “[i]t shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of 
violating Sections 13A-12-200.2 and 13A-12-200.3 that the act 
charged was done for a bona fide medical, scientific, educational, 
legislative, judicial, or law enforcement purpose.”197 
Likewise, in Carey, the challenged statute prohibited the sale 
and distribution of any contraceptive to a person under the age of 
sixteen;198 while the statute allowed a “licensed pharmacist” to dis­
tribute the contraceptives, they could not “advertise[ ] or display” 
contraceptives.199  The Carey statute, which was held unconstitu­
tional, also included a provision that allowed a doctor to prescribe 
the contraceptives, paralleling the Massachusetts statute in Eisen­
stadt, and the statute prohibiting the sale of sexual devices in 
Alabama.200 
The exemptions provided by the various statutes are an ac­
knowledgment that there is a medical need for both contraceptives 
and sexual devices, and while both contraceptives and sexual de­
vices are used in non-procreative-sexual activity, they also have le­
gitimate medical purposes. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 442. 
194. Id. at 454-55. 
195. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005). 
196. Id. 
197. § 13A-12-200.4. 
198. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l., 431 U.S. 678, 681 n.1 (1977) (discussing 
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6811(8) (McKinney 1972)). 
199. Id. (quoting § 6811(8)). 
200. Id. at 678 (discussing N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6807(b) (McKinney 1972)); see 
supra notes 191, 197 and accompanying text. R 
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1.	 The Similarities Between Contraceptives and Sexual 
Devices 
The Eleventh and the Fifth Circuits, however, are split on how 
to apply Lawrence to their anti-vibrator statutes.  As stated earlier, 
the Eleventh Circuit, in Williams v. Attorney General, declined to 
extend the ruling in Lawrence to the Alabama anti-vibrator stat­
ute.201  In contrast, the Fifth Circuit, in Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. 
Earle, ruled that Lawrence was broad enough to cover the anti-
vibrator statute in Texas.202  While the two circuits disagree, both 
failed to properly make the analogy to the circumstances in Gris­
wold, Eisenstadt, and Carey. 
Much like with contraceptives, sexual devices are used by mar­
ried and un-married persons alike, not exclusively by women.203 
Contraceptives are used for multiple reasons, such as the preven­
tion of pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases.204  In June 
2000, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), along with the Cen­
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and the United States Agency for Interna­
tional Development (USAID), produced a fact sheet stating that 
“[l]atex condoms, when used consistently and correctly, are highly 
effective in preventing the sexual transmission of HIV . . . [and can] 
reduce[ ] the risk of other sexually transmitted diseases.”205 
At the trial level, one of the plaintiffs in Williams,206 an owner 
and operator of “Saucy Lady, Inc.,”207 explained that many of those 
who attended her sale parties purchased said devices “because they 
prefer to avoid sexual relations with others, due to prior negative 
relationships, or the risk of sexually transmitted diseases, or other 
risks associated with developing an intimate relationship.”208  An­
201. Williams v. Att’y Gen. 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (2004). 
202. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 744 (2008); see supra notes 
175-176. R 
203. See Indiana University, Vibrator Use Common, Linked to Sexual Health, SCI­
ENCE DAILY (June 29, 2009), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/06/0906291006 
43.htm; see also Banerjee, supra note 50 (reviewing a book written by Anne Semans, R 
where the author’s main purpose was to “remove the stigma of sex toys as the compan­
ions of lonely women and introducing them into couple’s [sic] love play”). 
204. DEP’T OF  HEALTH AND  HUMAN  SERV., Ctrs. for Disease Control and Pre­
vention, Condoms and STDs: Fact Sheet for Public Health Personnel 1-3, http://www. 
cdc.gov/condomeffectiveness/docs/Condoms_and_STDS.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
205. Id. at 1. 
206. Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1264 (N.D. Ala. 2002), rev’d, 378 
F.3d 1232. 
207. Id. at 1264. 
208. Id. at 1265. 
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other plaintiff, Jane Doe, “use[d] the devices to avoid sexually 
transmitted diseases, while remaining sexually active.”209  Two re­
cent Indiana University studies involving sexual device use among 
adult American men and women found “that vibrator use is associ­
ated with more positive sexual function and being more proactive in 
caring for one’s sexual health.”210 
The similarity between sexual devices and contraceptives is not 
a new or entirely unexplored concept.  In 2006, New Delhi, India 
was undergoing a similar battle regarding anti-vibrator statutes.211 
Sex toys are banned in India, but the market is quite large.212  “Sex­
ologists say that the ban in India on these toys is ridiculous, since 
they are the safest, best and cheapest form of sexual entertain­
ment.”213  Dr. Prakash Kothari, India’s leading advocate for sexual 
devices, believes that these sexual devices “help in facilitating safe 
sex thus preventing unwanted pregnancies, controlling population 
growth and [the] spread of HIV.”214  He further finds it ironic that 
the Indian government actively distributes free condoms, but con­
currently bans sexual devices, which similarly help promote safe 
sex.215  Kristin Fasullo, a scholar, notes that “[m]edical experts have 
also lauded sexual devices as safe alternatives in an era of HIV/ 
AIDS and high incidence of sexually transmitted infections.”216 
Not only do sexual devices assist in protecting against sexually 
transmitted diseases, but both sexual devices and certain contracep­
tives have medical benefits that cannot be overlooked.  “Oral con­
traceptives have been found to reduce incidence of PID (pelvic 
inflammatory disease) . . . [and] the risk of ectopic pregnancy.”217 
Additionally, using birth control pills for one or more years can re­
duce the risk of endometrial cancer.218 
209. Id. at 1266. 
210. Indiana University, supra note 203. R 
211. Atul Sethi, Palika a Haven for Adult Toys, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Nov. 26, 
2006), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Palika-a-haven-for-adult-toys/ 
articleshow/576431.cms. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Kristin Fasullo, Note, Beyond Lawrence v. Texas: Crafting a Fundamental 
Right to Sexual Privacy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2997, 3009 (2009). 
217. UNIV. OF WIS. UNIV. HEALTH SERV., BENEFITS OF BIRTH CONTROL PILLS, 
(Aug. 2000), http://wellness.uwsp.edu/medinfo/handouts/Benefits%20of%20Birth%20 
Control%20Pills.pdf. 
218. Id. 
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The Food and Drug Administration also acknowledges 
the medical usefulness of certain sexual devices.219  Two of their 
regulations, entitled “[p]owered vaginal muscle stimulator for 
therapeutic use”220 and “[g]enital vibrator for therapeutic 
use”221 respectively, implicitly recognize that the same sexual de­
vices prohibited by statute in Williams and Reliable Consultants, 
Inc. have medicinal value.  In State v. Hughes, the Kansas Supreme 
Court heard a doctor’s testimony that the vibrator is incredibly 
helpful for women who “may be particularly susceptible to pelvic 
inflammatory diseases, psychological problems, and difficulty in 
marital relationships.”222  The trial court in Williams223 noted that 
several of the plaintiffs used the banned devices for therapeutic 
purposes.  One woman, for example, had a chronic disability that 
made it incredibly painful to engage in traditional intercourse with 
a partner, making the use of the devices a necessary part of her 
intimate relationships.224 
Such findings do not discount the use of sexual devices purely 
for purposes of enjoyment.  In her article, Pathology Full Circle: A 
History of Anti-Vibrator Legislation in the United States, Danielle 
Lindemann expresses concern over reducing the value of these de­
vices to purely medical applications, as they were in the past, and 
not recognizing their use by women for purposes of sexual plea­
sure.225  While Ms. Lindemann’s argument is a valid one, it risks 
pigeonholing the devices by ignoring the fact that they are not used 
by women alone.  As the Indiana University studies show, fifty-
three percent of women and forty-five percent of men in the United 
States reportedly use these devices.226  The studies found that 
219. Powered Vaginal Muscle Stimulator for Therapeutic Use, 21 C.F.R. 
§ 884.5940 (2010); Genital Vibrator Therapeutic Use, 21 C.F.R. § 884.5960. 
220. § 884.5940 (identifying that the “device is intended and labeled for therapeu­
tic use in increasing muscular tone and strength in the treatment of sexual 
dysfunction”). 
221. § 884.5960 (identifying the “device as intended and labeled for therapeutic 
use in the treatment of sexual dysfunction or [as] an adjunct to Kegel’s exercise”). 
222. State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Kan. 1990). 
223. Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1266 (N.D. Ala., 2002), rev’d, 378 
F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004). 
224. Id. 
225. Danielle J. Lindemann, Pathology Full Circle: A History of Anti-Vibrator 
Legislation in the United States, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 326, 342 (2006). 
226. Indiana University, supra note 203 (discussing studies funded by the maker R 
of Trojan brand sexual-health products which looked at the sexual habits of 2,056 wo­
men and 1,047 men between the ages of eighteen and sixty). The studies noted that 
female “[v]ibrator users were significantly more likely to have had a gynecological exam 
during the past year” and male users “were more likely to report participation in sexual 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE105.txt unknown Seq: 29 27-SEP-11 10:20 
2011] THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANTI-VIBRATOR STATUTES 239 
ninety-one percent of men who used vibrators did so with a female 
partner.227  The study tends to support the theory that, like contra­
ceptives, these devices are an integral part of a healthy sexual rela­
tionship between two people.  It is a legitimate concern for critics to 
want to ensure that society does not regress back to a time when 
vibrators were thought to be purely medical devices for curing hys­
teria.228  However, it is inaccurate to assume that because the other 
benefits and uses of sexual devices may be therapeutic—thus val­
idly bringing these devices into the realm of constitutional protec­
tion—society is reverting back to paternalism. 
2. Applying Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey 
While the Lawrence decision might have reiterated that inti­
mate non-procreative relationships are protected from government 
intrusion, it did not involve any non-biological devices that were 
being regulated by the state.  Due to the fact that contraceptives 
and sexual devices have many similarities, in order to show that 
these anti-vibrator statutes are unconstitutional, a better analysis 
involves the same rationale applied by the Supreme Court in cases 
challenging anti-contraceptive laws. 
There is a strong conceptual similarity between contraceptives 
and sexual devices because both are used by married and un-mar­
ried persons, and there have been various attempts to regulate their 
sale.  With the exception of the statute in Griswold, which prohib­
ited the actual use of contraceptives,229 the other anti-contraceptive 
statutes attempted to regulate their sale and distribution,230 much 
like the current anti-vibrator statutes do. 
health promoting behaviors.” Id.; see also Romi Lassally, Sex Toys for Tweens, Aug. 
27, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/romi-lassally/sex-toys-for-tweens_b_270300. 
html (a post debating whether mothers of teenage daughters should purchase sex toys 
for their daughters).  The post mentions an Oprah segment where a “sexpert” sug­
gested that this might encourage abstinence.  Lassally, supra.  Dr. Karen Rayne 
weighed in on when a young girl should be exposed to such devices as a vibrator, noting 
that “the problem with going too young is that it might just scare her off masturbation 
entirely.  In general, I would probably suggest when she turns sixteen.  However, with 
the caveat that some girls will put them to good use younger.” Id. 
227. Indiana University, supra note 203. R 
228. Lindemann, supra note 225, at 343. R 
229. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (involving a Connecticut 
statute that made it illegal for a person to use “any drug . . . or instrument for the 
purpose of preventing conception”). 
230. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 680 (1977); Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1972); see also supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text. R 
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The Court in Eisenstadt found that the Massachusetts law that 
prohibited the sale of contraceptives would “materially impair the 
ability of single persons to obtain contraceptives.”231  The statute in 
question in Eisenstadt allowed single persons to purchase contra­
ceptives to prevent diseases, but not conception.232  This is similar 
to the anti-vibrator statutes that allow the distribution of sexual de­
vices for therapeutic purposes from a doctor or counselor, but not 
for other purposes or from a business other than a doctor’s of­
fice.233  The Court in Carey noted that “decisions whether to ac­
complish or to prevent conception are among the most private and 
sensitive.”234  Likewise, sexual devices are used by individuals and 
couples, and are often used to prevent pregnancy and the transmis­
sion of sexually transmitted diseases.235 Carey further held that “[a] 
total prohibition against [the] sale of contraceptives, for example, 
would intrude upon individual decisions in matters of procreation 
and contraception as harshly as a direct ban on their use.”236  Es­
sentially, the Court has recognized that there is a right among indi­
viduals to make decisions impacting their sexual activity, including 
the personal determination of which items, meant to assist or pre­
vent contraception, will be brought into their bedroom. The Court 
noted that a prohibition on the sale of contraceptives “might have 
an even more devastating effect upon the freedom to choose 
contraception.”237 
Likewise, even though the use of sexual devices is allowed, the 
prohibition on their sale significantly burdens a person’s right to 
invite those items into their bedroom for the purposes of sexual 
intimacy, not for procreative purposes.  If persons choose to involve 
sexual devices in their intimate relationships (or alone) in hopes of 
preventing the acquisition of sexually transmitted diseases and un­
wanted pregnancy, the prohibition of their sale, like that of contra­
ceptives, seriously limits the “distribution channels to a small 
fraction of the total number of possible retail outlets . . . [and] 
reduces the opportunity for privacy of selection and purchase.”238 
231. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446. 
232. Id. at 449. 
233. Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004). 
234. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685. 
235. See Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1266 (N.D. Ala. 2002), rev’d, 378 
F.3d 1232. 
236. Carey, 431 U.S. at 687-88 (emphasis added). 
237. Id. at 688. 
238. Id. at 689. 
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The cases pre-Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey dealing with 
contraceptive statutes and their reasoning read very similar to the 
current court cases refusing to deem anti-vibrator statutes unconsti­
tutional.  In 1956, in State v. Kohn, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
upheld a law that prohibited the sale of contraceptives without just 
cause.239  The “just cause” in the statute was found to mean cause 
found by a physician or druggist, perhaps being prescribed to pre­
vent a disease.240  Because the statute had this “just cause” provi­
sion, which the court took to mean for medical purposes, the statute 
was upheld.241 
Similarly, in Williams v. Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit 
found it important that the statute provided an exemption for “sales 
of sexual devices” for medical purposes.242  This reasoning ignores 
the fact that preventing the in-state sale and distribution severely 
limits the manner in which people can purchase these devices for 
purposes allowed under the statute.  As the doctor testified in State 
v. Hughes, intra-state unavailability severely impacts an individual’s 
ability to purchase sexual devices; this is true even with the option 
of going to another state to purchase them.243 
The variety of uses and purposes of sexual devices, like those 
of contraceptives, coupled with the introduction of the devices into 
an intimate relationship, make Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey the 
correct line of cases under which to analyze these anti-vibrator 
statutes. 
3.	 Why the Statutes Would Fare Better Under the Type of 
Review Granted to an Already Existing Fundamental Right 
The Due Process Clause “‘provides heightened protection 
against government interference with certain fundamental 
239. State v. Kohn, 127 A.2d 451, 455 (N.J. 1956). The New Jersey statute stated: 
“Any person who, without just cause, utters or exposes to the view of 
another, or possesses with intent to utter or expose to the view of another, or 
to sell the same, any instrument, medicine or other thing, designed or purport­
ing to be designed for the prevention of conception or the procuring of abor­
tion, or who in any way advertises or aids in advertising the same, or in any 
manner, whether by recommendation for or against its use or otherwise, gives 
or causes to be given, or aids in giving any information how or where any such 
instrument, medicine or other thing may be had, seen, bought or sold, is a 
disorderly person.” 
Id. at 452 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-75 (repealed 1978)). 
240. Id. at 454-55. 
241. Id. at 455. 
242. Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004). 
243. State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Kan. 1990). 
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rights.’”244  In Carey, the Supreme Court ruled that prohibitions on 
the sale of contraceptives “‘may be justified only by a compelling 
state interest and must be narrowly drawn to express only the legiti­
mate state interests at stake.’”245  While this heightened scrutiny 
applies to statutes affecting fundamental rights, it does not apply to 
statutes affecting subject matters like economics or tax.246  If a fun­
damental right is not implicated, the court will apply a more defer­
ential standard to the statute known as “rational basis review.”247 
Rational basis review does not require the same level of scrutiny by 
a reviewing court and only requires that the statute be “rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental interest.”248  When a statute is 
examined under rational basis review, the burden is on the chal­
lenging party to negate “‘every conceivable basis which might sup­
port it.’”249  Under this review, there is a presumption of 
constitutionality, and judicial review is not a time for the courts to 
second-guess legislative choices.250  When a statute is reviewed 
under a high legislative deference standard such as rational basis 
review, it is rare for a court to hold that statute unconstitutional and 
the presumption of validity will prevail,251 unless it is based on 
“grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objec­
tives.”252  This standard lies in vast contrast to the heightened 
review that a statute affecting a fundamental right will receive.  A 
heightened review standard, while not always reaching strict scru­
tiny,253 does not provide the same deference to a state’s justification 
for a statute as granted under rational basis review.  Such height­
ened scrutiny often involves a balancing of the right asserted and 
the government purpose for regulating that asserted right.254 
244. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (quoting Washington v. Gluck­
sberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)). 
245. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977) (quoting Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973)). 
246. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985). 
247. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2008). 
248. Id. at 55. 
249. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore 
Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)). 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. Cook, 528 F.3d at 55 (quoting Heller, 509 U.S. at 324) (holding that the 
military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” statute did not violate the Due Process Clause). 
253. Strict scrutiny requires that a statute be “narrowly tailored to serve a com­
pelling state interest.” Id. 
254. Id. at 55-56; see also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1992) (balanc­
ing the interest of a person rejecting psychotropic drugs against the government’s inter­
est in trying a competent criminal defendant); Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep’t of Health, 
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The Eleventh and Fifth Circuits both used Lawrence v. Texas 
to rule on the Alabama and Texas statutes respectively.255  Each 
circuit, using the same Supreme Court case, reached very different 
conclusions.  The proper standard of review to apply to the anti-
vibrator statutes has been unclear to lower courts, particularly after 
Lawrence v. Texas.256  The First Circuit noted that several courts 
read Lawrence to have applied a rational basis standard of re­
view,257 others have claimed the Court used strict scrutiny,258 and 
yet others, including the First Circuit, have read Lawrence to be 
neither rational or strict, but an in-between standard that requires a 
balancing of interests.259  The difference in outcome when applying 
these standards can be seen in the current circuit split. When apply­
ing rational basis review, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the Ala­
bama anti-vibrator statute did not violate the Due Process Clause 
and found public morality sufficed as a legitimate government in­
terest.260  In contrast, when the Fifth Circuit applied a heightened 
scrutiny test (what it believed to be the proper standard after Law­
rence), it found the Texas anti-vibrator statute to “impermissibly 
burden[ ]” “the right to engage in private intimate conduct of his or 
her choosing.”261 
The current circuit split demonstrates the issue with framing 
the right that these anti-vibrator statutes affect,262 which is a princi­
ple reason for arguing that the use of sexual devices falls within the 
already existing right to contraception. The split additionally high­
497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990) (balancing “protected liberty interest” in declining un­
wanted medical treatment with the government’s interest in promoting life); Youngberg 
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320-22 (1982) (balancing right of a person to avoid bodily 
restraint against the State’s reasons for justifying restraint). 
255. See supra notes 166-170, 175-180 and accompanying text. R 
256. See Cook, 528 F.3d at 49-52. 
257. Id. at 51 n.5. 
258. Id. at 51 n.6. 
259. Id. at 51 n.7. 
260. Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2007). 
261. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 743-44 (5th Cir. 2008). The 
Eleventh Circuit used the “impermissibl[y] burdens” test. Id. at 743. Casey created 
“the ‘undue burden’ test, which balance[s] the state’s legitimate interest in potential 
human life against the extent of the imposition on the woman’s liberty interest” in the 
autonomy of her own body. Cook, 528 F.3d at 55 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)). 
262. Reliable Consultants, Inc. framed the right at issue as a “right to engage in 
private intimate conduct of his or her choosing.” Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 
744. Williams framed the right as “whether the Constitution protects a right to sell and 
buy sexual devices, [as well as] a right to use such devices.” Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 
F.3d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis omitted). 
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lights the importance of the review standard applied to these stat­
utes.  If the use of sexual devices does not receive the form of 
heightened scrutiny typically afforded a fundamental right, any gov­
ernment interest will suffice in justifying the ban on buying and sell­
ing sexual devices, leading to results such as the one seen in the 
Eleventh Circuit in Williams. 
When the right to buy and sell sexual devices is placed under 
the existing right that protects access to contraception, the same 
standard of review applied in Carey v. Population Services Interna­
tional and Eisenstadt v. Baird will be applied.  In Carey, the Su­
preme Court ruled “that when a State . . . burdens the exercise of a 
fundamental right, its attempt to justify that burden as a rational 
means for the accomplishment of some significant state policy re­
quires more than a bare assertion, based on a conceded complete 
absence of supporting evidence, that the burden is connected to 
such a policy.”263  The Court rejected the State’s rationale for limit­
ing the sale of contraceptives to minors, which the State argued was 
to stress “the seriousness with which the State views the decision to 
engage in sexual intercourse.”264  In Eisenstadt, the State’s interest 
in protecting “morals through ‘regulating the private sexual lives of 
single persons’” was rejected, as the Court believed the actual goal 
was purely to limit the sale of contraception.265  Texas had similar 
justifications for its anti-vibrator statute, which were “‘discouraging 
prurient interests in autonomous sex and the pursuit of sexual grati­
fication unrelated to procreation and prohibiting the commercial 
sale of sex.’”266  In Alabama, the State argued that their interest in 
protecting public morality was a legitimate government interest sur­
viving rational basis review of the anti-vibrator statute.267  Had the 
Alabama statute been reviewed under the standard set forth in Ca­
rey, it is highly unlikely the government interest would have been 
sufficient justification for the burden on purchasing the sexual 
devices. 
263. Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 696 (1977). 
264. Id. at 697. 
265. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 442 (1972) (quoting Sturgis v. Att’y Gen., 
260 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Mass. 1970)). 
266. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 745 (quoting the State’s “asserted 
interests”). 
267. Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2007). 
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CONCLUSION 
There is currently an ongoing debate about how to frame the 
right at issue here.268  However, rather than attempting to try and 
frame an entirely different fundamental right, this Note has sug­
gested adding the purchase and sale of sexual devices under the 
umbrella of the right encompassing the purchase and sale of contra­
ceptives.  As the Supreme Court noted in Washington v. Gluck­
sberg, the addition of another fundamental right is not a task that is 
to be taken lightly.  There appears to be a real hesitation amongst 
the courts, the lower courts in particular, to add an additional right 
to the already existing list.  The history of sexual devices in the 
United States, and the current studies on their use, allow sexual 
devices to be fairly easily compared to contraceptives. The similari­
ties between the uses and the regulation of sexual devices and con­
traceptives would allow a court to protect the purchase of sexual 
devices without having to go through the burdensome Glucksberg 
analysis.  Additionally, due to the vagueness of the Lawrence deci­
sion with regards to whether it actually created a new broader fun­
damental right to privacy, previous cases offer more guidance 
regarding how to defeat these statutes attempting to regulate the 
commercial activity at issue.  If the courts accept this analogy, they 
will most likely follow the reasoning put forth in the line of cases 
overruling the anti-contraceptive statutes, and therefore hold the 
anti-vibrator statutes unconstitutional. 
Julie McKenna* 
268. See Fasullo, supra note 216, at 3009 (arguing for a broader fundamental right R 
to sexual privacy); Lindemann, supra note 225, at 326 (arguing that framing the right R 
around the medical uses of sexual devices ignores the necessity of a right for a woman 
to use these devices in whichever way they choose). 
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